Mostrando las entradas con la etiqueta Marshall. Mostrar todas las entradas
Mostrando las entradas con la etiqueta Marshall. Mostrar todas las entradas

19 agosto, 2013

Tras Spinoza: más sabios, más libres, más felices

En 2010, Ursula Renz (Universidad Alpen-Adria, Klagenfurt, Austria) ganó el premio Journal of the History of Philosophy, que otorga el prestigiado editor Vittorio Klostermann, por su libro Die Erklärbarkeit von Erfahrung: Realismus und Subjektivität in Spinozas Theorie des menschlichen Geistes (La explicabilidad de la experiencia: Realismo y subjetividad en la teoría de la mente humana en Spinoza), mismo que le permitió la entrada a la escena de la filosofía europea en general; si bien, ya era reconocida en el mundo de la filosofía en alemán como una señalada especialista en neokantismo de fin de siglo, así como por su ensayo sobre Cohen, Natorp y Cassirer.

Según la reseña de Martin Saar, en Notra Dame Philosophical Reviews, Renz elabora en su monografía sobre Spinoza una interpretación original, además de rigorosamente argumentada, de la segunda parte de la Ética que gira alrededor de la apuesta filosófica fundamental de Spinoza --‘La experiencia subjetiva puede ser explicada, y su explicación exitosa es éticamente relevante porque nos hace más sabios, más libres y más felices’--, y al mismo tiempo, hace una interesante contribución a los debates filosóficos actuales sobre la mente insistiendo en la categoría spinoziana de la mente como idea del cuerpo --‘un cuerpo auto-consciente’. He aquí la entrevista que Renz concedió a la revista electrónica 3:AM (septiembre, 2012) a propósito de Spinoza.

Hacer clic aquí: After Spinoza: Wiser, Freer, Happier 

05 agosto, 2013

De la servidumbre a la libertad: Spinoza sobre la excelencia humana

Eugene Marshall

LeBUFFE, Michael. From Bondage to Freedom: Spinoza on Human Excellence, Oxford University Press, New York, 2010, 253 pp.

Michael LeBuffe's From Bondage to Freedom: Spinoza on Human Excellence is an excellent presentation of Spinoza's moral theory. LeBuffe presents and analyzes not only the moral theory itself but also its place in Spinoza's system. This book is a significant contribution that ought to be read by anyone interested in the ethics or moral psychology of early modern philosophy, in addition to Spinoza scholars.

Consider Spinoza's Ethics. How does one approach such a monumental work? One could say that readers should begin at the beginning. This tactic mirrors many interpretations of his work, in that readers often interpret its later parts in terms of the earlier doctrines. To be sure, such a method can lead to profound results. For example, Michael Della Rocca's recent book, Spinoza, interprets Spinoza's system from the perspective of the principle of sufficient reason, which appears in the second axiom of Part One and, more clearly, a few pages later in the 11th proposition, allowing him a powerful and informative lens with which to view Spinoza.

This is not the only avenue of entry into Spinoza's system, however. Instead of beginning at the beginning, one may skip ahead to the end and see whodunit. Indeed, several considerations justify such an approach. For one, Spinoza's system is synthetic and geometric in form: geometric in that it proceeds like a demonstration from Euclid's Elements, employing deductive inference from axioms and definitions to propositions; and synthetic in that it begins at the simplest concepts and builds up to something more complex, ostensibly the aim of the demonstration. The Ethics culminates with a discussion of the highest human good, suggesting that this doctrine may be the aim of Spinoza's project, the earlier parts having been presented in service to this end. What's more, Spinoza himself claims that his goal is, ultimately, to lead us to "knowledge of the human mind and its highest blessedness" (Preface, Part II). So, another way to read the Ethics is to begin with its end in mind.

Michael LeBuffe takes such an approach, presenting an interpretation of Spinoza's thought that puts these considerations at the forefront. By focusing on Spinoza's moral theory, LeBuffe provides the reader with two benefits: first, his focus affords us a valuable lens through which to view Spinoza's system; second, his explanation demonstrates the appeal of Spinoza's moral theory in its own right.

According to LeBuffe, Spinoza's moral theory brings together several disparate strands of Spinoza's thought, strands with which commentators have wrestled for some time. The first
strand concerns Part III's conatus, the striving to persevere in our being that constitutes our essence. Throughout Part III and into Part IV, Spinoza describes this essence as a striving to persevere in our being, where that is understood as whatever increases our power of acting. Spinoza builds a value system onto this story, whereby that which increases our power and thus aids our persevering is good and that which does not is bad. By the time we reach Part V, however, Spinoza has switched his terminology, understanding good and bad in terms of knowledge and ignorance, or activity and passivity of the mind. LeBuffe states the issue as follows, saying, "What is the relationship between these two ends of human action, perseverance in being and knowledge?". The answer to this question lies at the heart of LeBuffe's project here.