Mostrando las entradas con la etiqueta Estado ('imperium'). Mostrar todas las entradas
Mostrando las entradas con la etiqueta Estado ('imperium'). Mostrar todas las entradas

09 abril, 2015

‘Imperium’: notes on the thought of Spinoza

Stephen Connelly

A practical comprehension of Spinoza’s theory of natural right allows us to begin to use this conceptual tool to construct our world. This is the essence of Spinoza’s ethico-political project: how to use the doctrine of natural right to construct machines that increase our power. Consequently, when we come to the question of the organisation of society, virtuous law and politics amount to the endeavour to build-right augmenting machines, which Spinoza calls imperia.

Let us begin our brief survey with Spinoza’s definition of sovereignty in his Tractatus Politicus (“TP”) II[17]:

Hoc ius, quod multitudinis potentia definitur, imperium appellari solet. Atque hoc is absolute tenet, qui curam reipublicae ex communi consensu habet…

This right, which is defined by the power of the multitude, is usually called the imperium. It is held absolutely by whoever has oversight of the republic by common consensus. (my trans.)

Spinoza thus settles upon the idea that the imperium is an expression of common power, that is, it is an expression of power of a group of individuals insofar only as they act as one. Notice that according to a principle of superposition of powers we do not obtain a ‘new’ consciousness unless those powers determine the bodies on which they act to some existence. It is therefore appropriate to define this mode. We define:

An imperium is a singularity of projection which does not appear in the field of right as an origin prior to that projection.

In Spinozan terms of Extension, this amounts to saying that given any locality there is a transition occurring which is not due to difference of motion and rest at that point i.e. there is no individual in the sense of EIIP13 Lem.1.From this we propose:

The principle of common right: every act of β1β2βn in union is a partial solution to the aggregate natures of each of β1, β2βn, and each such act expresses their common nature as an imperium.

More simply, when people determine to work together, they seem to posit a common power which is localisable in no One, and this seeming power is their common right. Contrary to some interpretations, it is an ethical strength, not a weakness (see the forthcoming article on Multitude).

Now, given that the virtue of any number of humans is variable, it is likewise possible to posit a series of imperia, each of which express common right, that is, the common natures of each constituent, with greater reality. It seems that a form of this principle is readily adopted by Marx in his chapter of Capital on Co-operation, though following John Bellers, he is keen to notice that combination of power also generates a “collective power” where 10 men straining to lift a ton is qualitatively not equivalent to 100 men each using a finger, an observation far beyond Spinoza’s frame of reference [1]. It is this working hypothesis of a series of imperia, each with a common right appropriate to itself, which allows us to understand the flow of Spinoza’s Tractatus politicus, to which we now turn.