Mostrando las entradas con la etiqueta Butler. Mostrar todas las entradas
Mostrando las entradas con la etiqueta Butler. Mostrar todas las entradas

03 junio, 2016

The Desire to Live. Spinoza’s ‘Ethics’ under Pressure

Judith Butler

Butler, Judith. “The Desire to Live. Spinoza’s ‘Ethics’ under Pressure”. In Senses of the Subject. New York: Fordham University Press, 2015, pp. 63-89.

The desire to live is not an easy topic to pursue. On the one hand, it seems too basic to thematize; on the other hand, it is vexed enough as a topic to cast doubt on whether one can settle the question of what is meant by the phrase itself. The desire to live is not the same as self- preservation, though both can be understood as interpretations of a person’s desire “to persevere in its being,” Spinoza’s well-known phrase. Although self-preservation is largely associated with forms of individual self-interest associated with later contractarian political philosophers, Spinoza’s philosophy establishes another basis for ethics, one that has implications for social solidarity and a critique of individualism. The self that endeavors to persevere in its own being is not always a singular self for Spinoza, and neither does it necessarily succeed in augmenting or enhancing its life if it does not at once enhance the lives of others. Indeed, in what follows, I hope to establish within Spinoza not only a critical perspective on individualism, but also an acknowledgment of the possibility for self-destruction. Both of these insights come to have political implications when recast as part of a dynamic conception of political solidarity in which sameness cannot be assumed. The fact that Spinoza takes some version of self- preservation to be essential to his conception of human beings is undisputed, but what that self is and what precisely it preserves is less than clear. He has been criticized by psychoanalysts who contend that he leaves no room for the death drive, and he has been appropriated by Deleuzians who for the most part wish to root negativity out of their conception of individuality and sociality alike. He has been castigated, as well, by writers like Levinas for espousing a form of individualism that would eradicate ethical relationality itself. I propose to test these views and to consider in some detail Spinoza’s view of the desire to live—not to establish a definitive reading, but to see what possibilities for social ethics emerge from his view.

When Spinoza claims that a human being seeks to persevere in its own being, does he assume that the desire to live is a form of self- preservation? Moreover, what conceptions of the “self” and of “life” are presupposed by this view? Spinoza writes, “The striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing” (IIIP7, 159). It would seem that whatever else a being may be doing, it is persevering in its own being, and at first, this seemed to mean that even various acts of apparent self-destruction have something persistent and at least potentially life-affirming in them. I’ve since come to question this idea, and part of the purpose of this essay will be to query what, if anything, counters the force of perseverance itself. The formulation is problematic for another reason, as well, since it is not fully clear in what “one’s own being” consists, that is, where and when one’s own being starts and stops. In Spinoza’s Ethics, a conscious and persevering being does not persevere in its own being in a purely or exclusively self-referential way; this being is fundamentally responsive, and in emotional ways, suggesting that implicit in the very practice of perseverance is a referential movement toward the world. Depending on what kind of response a being undergoes, that being stands a chance of diminishing or enhancing its own possibility of future perseverance and life. This being desires not only to persevere in its own being, but to live in a world that reflects and furthers the possibility of that perseverance; indeed, perseverance in one’s own being requires that reflection from the world, such that persevering and modulating reference to the world are bound up together. Finally, although it may seem that the desire to persevere is an individual desire, it turns out to require and acquire a sociality that is essential to what perseverance means; “to persevere in one’s own being” is thus to live in a world that not only reflects but furthers the value of others’ lives as well as one’s own.

15 abril, 2010

Judith Butler y la situación filosófica

¿Qué es una situación filosófica? ¿Qué de las circunstancias justifica la intervención de la filosofía? –se pregunta Alain Badiou en su libro Filosofía del presente. No todo, por cierto, no cualquier discurso. En este texto, Badiou nos sugiere una definición provisional: ‘una situación es filosófica, o ‘para’ la filosofía, cuando impone la existencia de una relación entre términos que, en general, o para la opinión establecida, no pueden tener relación. Una situación filosófica es un encuentro. Un encuentro entre dos términos esencialmente extraños, uno respecto del otro.’

Según Badiou, las tareas de la filosofía en relación con las situaciones son:

En primer lugar, iluminar las decisiones o elecciones fundamentales de la existencia o del pensamiento. Su tarea es clarificar la elección. Debemos decidir entre dos tipos de pensamiento, por ejemplo, entre el miedo y la libertad, entre la opresión y la libertad.

En segundo lugar, iluminar la distancia entre el pensamiento y el poder, la distancia entre el poder y el valor. Medir esa distancia, por ejemplo, entre la razón de Estado y la idea de justicia. Aquí no hay discusión verdadera. El poder significa violencia, mientras la justicia no conoce otros imperativos que sus propios principios. Porque el tiempo propio de la justicia no puede integrar los intereses del poder, se ejerce la violencia, mostrando así que entre el poder y la justicia no hay medida común. Sin embargo, esta situación ilumina un valor universalizable, común, la búsqueda del no-poder, esto es, rechazar y resistir el poder.

En tercer lugar, iluminar el valor de la excepción. El valor del acontecimiento. El valor de la ruptura. Y esto, contra la repetición de un pasado de exclusiones e injusticias.

De todo esto se trata el discurso que Judith Butler dirigiera, ayer miércoles 14 de abril, a los estudiantes de la Universidad de California en Berkeley convocando a la universidad a rechazar selectivamente las inversiones en compañías responsables de crímenes de guerra en Israel y otras partes del mundo. El 18 de marzo próximo pasado, los estudiantes del Senado de la universidad votaron un acuerdo, por 16 votos a favor y 4 en contra, que rechazaba las inversiones en las empresas transnacionales General Electric y United Technologies por ser responsables de crímenes de guerra en la ocupación ilegal de la franja de Gaza por parte de Israel. Una semana después, el presidente del Senado vetó el acuerdo.

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