Stephen Connelly
A practical
comprehension of Spinoza’s theory of natural right allows us to begin to use
this conceptual tool to construct our world. This is the essence of Spinoza’s
ethico-political project: how to use the doctrine of natural right to construct
machines that increase our power. Consequently, when we come to the question of
the organisation of society, virtuous law and politics amount to the endeavour
to build-right augmenting machines, which Spinoza calls imperia.
Let us begin our brief
survey with Spinoza’s definition of sovereignty in his Tractatus Politicus
(“TP”) II[17]:
Hoc ius, quod multitudinis potentia definitur, imperium
appellari solet. Atque hoc is absolute tenet, qui curam reipublicae ex communi
consensu habet…
This right, which is defined by the power of the multitude, is
usually called the imperium. It is held absolutely by whoever has oversight of
the republic by common consensus. (my trans.)
Spinoza thus settles
upon the idea that the imperium is an
expression of common power, that is, it is an expression of power of a group of
individuals insofar only as they act as one. Notice that according to a principle
of superposition of powers we do not obtain a ‘new’ consciousness unless those
powers determine the bodies on which they act to some existence. It is
therefore appropriate to define this mode. We define:
An imperium is
a singularity of projection which does not appear in the field of right as an
origin prior to that projection.
In Spinozan terms of
Extension, this amounts to saying that given any locality there is a transition
occurring which is not due to difference of motion and rest at that point i.e.
there is no individual in the sense of EIIP13 Lem.1.From this we
propose:
The principle of common right:
every act of β1, β2…βn
in union is a partial solution to the aggregate natures of each of β1,
β2…βn, and each such act expresses their
common nature as an imperium.
More simply, when
people determine to work together, they seem to posit a common power which is
localisable in no One, and this seeming power is their common right. Contrary
to some interpretations, it is an ethical strength, not a weakness (see the
forthcoming article on Multitude).
Now, given that the
virtue of any number of humans is variable, it is likewise possible to posit a series
of imperia, each of which express common right, that is, the common natures of
each constituent, with greater reality. It seems that a form of this principle
is readily adopted by Marx in his chapter of Capital on Co-operation,
though following John Bellers, he is keen to notice that combination of power
also generates a “collective power” where 10 men straining to lift a ton
is qualitatively not equivalent to 100 men each using a finger, an observation
far beyond Spinoza’s frame of reference [1]. It is this working hypothesis of a
series of imperia, each with a common right appropriate to itself, which allows
us to understand the flow of Spinoza’s Tractatus politicus, to which we
now turn.
1. From substance to imperium
Gueroult famously
established (1968) that Spinoza begins his derivation of the unique and
infinite divine substance first by dividing existing and acting, and then
constructing an infinite series of substances, each of which enacts a single
infinite attribute. He then resolves each such substance into a ‘One’ of sorts.
The subtlety of Spinoza’s move in part consists in the Socratic technique of
granting one’s contemporaries the commonplaces of their conception of God and
Nature, and drawing from these notions the true nature of things. It is our
conjecture that Spinoza deploys similar tactics in the Tractatus politicus,
where he moves from a conception of a series of imperia, each with its common
right and desire for security, towards one rational imperium which, if achievable at least in some degree, will ensure
the longer endurance of the given civil society [2].
2. The working definition of a state’s virtue as its security
Spinoza begins his
construction of the imperium in his
usual fashion with a definition, either directly, as in the Ethics, or
by way of discussion of a common conception, as in TTPIV and here in TPI:
Freedom of spirit or strength of mind is the virtue of the
private citizen: the virtue of a state is its security (TPI[6])
On first reading such
a privileging of security seems to open the door not to freedom but bondage. We
take the view that this statement plays a similar role to Ethics Part I Def.6,
where Spinoza defines God as an absolutely infinite entity, that is, a substance
consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite
essence. The primary tactical purpose of both definitions appears to be
Socratic, in that it posits a starting point with which Spinoza’s
contemporaries would have largely agreed had they not known what was coming
down the chain of reasons. One of the most fascinating aspects of Spinoza
studies is that whereas the sleight-of-hand Spinoza performs with the God
concept is well known and comfortably accepted today as something quite
shocking in the past, Spinoza’s reworking of the imperium is still shocking for us. As Balibar contends [3], it may
even have been shocking for Spinoza too. The claim that the virtue of the state
is security is either read as in tune with the Realpolitik of our own times or
as an apology for it [4]. Insofar as Spinoza’s treatise is understood as a kind
of letter to the prince about statecraft, not unlike Seneca’s De Clementia,
the above definition falls on the side of being rather attractive, though
perhaps also to Spinoza in his troubled times it was likewise a call for
envelopment. Our point, however, is that this ‘hook’ of a definition should be
treated with due caution, and that the flow of Spinoza’s argument leads us to
quite a different understanding of this beginning.
3. The existence of a multiplicity of imperia
The introductory
chapter of the TP ends with the following claim, which flows from the
conception of union of bodies and their right:
Finally, since men everywhere, whether barbarian or civilised,
enter into relationships with one another and set up some kind of civil order,
one should not look for the causes and natural foundations of a state in the
teachings of reason, but deduce them from the nature and conditions of humans
in general. (TPI[7])
As Wernham notes [5],
the decision that the foundations of the imperium cannot be deduced from the
precepts of reason appears to be an acknowledgement of the failure of social
contract theory to account for the very thing that renders a contract binding
(i.e. utility). Rather, the statement not only introduces the following
chapter’s discussion of natural right, but already makes the general claim that
there exist numerous imperia, indeed as many at any moment as express
the conditions or common nature of humans. The addition of “conditions” alerts
us to the fact that Spinoza, as TPI[6] has already made clear, is particularly
concerned with the variations in virtue of humans which determines a difference
of mutual condition and thus, juridically, a relative difference of natures
which diminishes common right. Spinoza is not saying that all humans form an imperium solely by being human; they
must act in union also. When powers or virtues are more alike, a mutual flow of
essential consciousness is constituted which operates according to a summation
of individual rights and discloses, at least in the common ecliptic, a union of
appearance, rather than thinghood proper. We are thus asked to imagine the
world as a confused flow of arbitrary unions of utility and common endeavour,
with a great disunity of purpose between these endeavours which just as much
leads to a state of war as would the isolated existence of single conatuses according to the Hobbesian
model of the state of nature. As Spinoza says, his state of nature is immanent
to the imperium.
4. The action of a multiplicity of natural rights
Having determined the
existence of multiple unions of convenience, each one an imperium, Spinoza now holds forth on his natural right theory. We
have explored this theory of natural right in our article on this subject and
so propose to summarise only the essential aspects at work. The primary purpose
of this discussion of natural right is to establish that each thing expresses
the natural right of God or Nature, firstly as infinite rights expressed at
local sources, secondly as finite rights within the general equilibrium, all of
which combine up to the right of the whole of dynamic Nature itself. The first
experience of this world is the endeavour to persevere in one’s being as an
existing thing, and derivatively to work according to one’s nature. This
endeavour is expressed foremost by the activity of every particular thing within
the constraints of the whole. Finite Nature must be understood, as we have
shown, not as partitioned between individuals and groups of individuals, but as
immanently summed across existence such that individual powers are coerced and
constrained from their fullest actualisation (the formal being of acts). At the
finite level, the character of each individual right is thus as indefinite as
its existence but for the existence and actions of each other thing.
5. The existence of a multiplicity of imperia, each with one right
In TPII[13 – 15]
Spinoza now combines the two. Firstly, by virtue of the principle of common
right (see above), forces are united and the consequent right is in combination
greater [6], but this possibility of combination is diminished by a difference
of virtue [7]. Secondly, Spinoza places such imperia in the context of the
natural state as a whole, noting that the more humans that unite in this way,
the more right they collectively possess, and can thus repel threats to their
territories and body. Further, the greater this combined right, the greater the
number of threats (the right of “all”) that can be repelled [8]. In other words,
there endeavours to exist a multiplicity of imperia, each expressing a combined
single natural right which is formally indefinite but actually restrained.
6. The particularity of each imperium’s right
The right of each imperium may be considered as a certain
species of event, that is, the aggregate act of each such combined body. It is
a partial solution to the common nature of the imperium’s constituents, yet, reliant as it is on these
constituents being in act, this partial solution will only express that nature
according to the combined virtue of its constituents. One can see from our
earlier combination of right that if we place a number of bodies in relation,
sum across their rights (and any tools transforming them), then the effects of such
combined right determine a projection towards a point which only has actually
existing bodies as its source. Even in the case of two bodies, as a third, less
virtuous body is affected, the result of summation of powers is that at that
moment this third body proceeds in a direction which does not appear to be due
to either. Descartes’ parallelogram rule for summing forces shows this. Even
with multiple bodies, this basic principle means that those effects which
appear as due to one body are certainly due to all as all combined. If we thus
imagine our combined group of bodies acting in union, the global movement may
be rationally determined to some centre which may or may not be located in any
one of the bodies. Indeed, it may be located outside of the group of bodies if
their combined desire is towards something they do not possess.
Now, these sorts of
ephemeral desires are the bane of passionate existence for Spinoza, and he
spends much time decrying greed and lusts as precisely those sorts of desires
which in combination can lead whole imperia astray. These are the whims and
fancies of the multitude which take on the geometrical form of a group of
bodies endeavouring to attain what they imagine is their salvation. Their
problem is, however, that given that such passionate pursuits are grounded in imagination,
the actions of the united body are of necessity contrary to that unity, and as
we approach the limit case the union will tear itself apart. This limit is but
one extreme, the other being the limit of a city of the wise, and as with this
latter, Spinoza regards them as more unlikely than not. His interest is in
actually existing states which do last at least a few years and thus evidence a
degree of common purpose. There is a spectrum of imperia, defined by natural right
according to their virtue. This spectrum provides the variable basis which
allows us to consider the existence of multiple imperia, each with their own
interests according to their determinate right, here understood as their
combined ability to express the common nature of their constituent bodies. In
short Spinoza wishes to focus on cases where the actions of each body project
with a certain degree of regularity this common centre of purpose which appears
as union.
From all this we find
we have little trouble understanding the infamous statement in TPII[16] that: “where
men have common rights…[they] are all guided as if by one mind” [9]. The
degree of virtue of the imperium
determines the reality of this united mind where reality is understood
as the intensity, clarity and distinctness of the effects of the common
endeavour of the bodies in that imperium.
The more power those individuals express, the more their common natures are
expressed together, and thus the more this common nature, this common notion of
the human as Spinoza’s foremost ethical ens rationis, is expressed and
projected into the world. This being of reason, though it be virtuously
affirmed, does not have being except in the limit. By all means the imperium exists, but it is not a
particular thing. It is a mode; an effect of particular things. It is also a mode
of thought, and thus qua idea, it can be a tool which transforms an
individual’s power of acting. But the mode cannot cause this idea to enter an
individual’s mind; rather, other individuals in act must cause it to so enter,
whether by hearsay or simply by the existence of the effects of common right. When
we speak of imperium, the specific
benefits to natural right it may be said to confer are properly derivative of
the rights of its common constituents, and they alone. The imperium appears as if it were one mind, when in fact it is the
result of many acting in common. Conversely, this common right, which the power
of the multitude defines, is generally called the imperium (TPII[17]). Notice (i) the explicit generative use of “defines”
which Spinoza deploys, and (ii) the “generally called” (appellari
solet) indicating that the imperia Spinoza is discussing have a
questionable nomenclature. We may be able to discern the reason in due course.
This being of reason forms
the totem or anchor for a number of institutions which flow from the appearance
of common consent. Spinoza completes TPII by repeating what he has already
shown in EIVP37 Sch.2, namely that justice, injustice, sin, blame, praise and
merit, are all things which are constructed within the imperium. At this stage Spinoza prefers to relate these concepts,
which are engendered by civil laws, back to the common consent of the imperium. It follows that the virtue
ascribable to such laws and conceptions of justice are indexed to the virtue of
the imperium, that is, their reality
or power derives from the reality or power of the imperium such that all laws and related conceptions, though they
contain the same signs, vary in their power according to the virtue of the imperium that expresses certain common
natures. While the augmentation of power is simple, and so does not specify a
‘true’ justice, its ability to augment the power of enduring and working assists
the ability to express a formal essence through work, and, in the imperium,
one’s common nature. This provides an interesting argument for human rights,
for the fluidity of the imperium
notion, which simply requires human common endeavour, means that contrary to
positivists’ view of the matter; the common endeavour of multiple individuals
in various territories to uphold what they commonly consent to as human rights
constitutes an imperium with a degree
of reality in just the same way as a more classical territorial state. Indeed,
human rights may be seen as having the reality (the power) that they do, in
spite of their lack of enforcement power, precisely because of the unity of the
mind of the individuals involved, which expresses their common nature in a
greater degree. Save the concreteness of Spinoza’s conception of formal essence
means that we must be alive to the mutability of the common that is expressed
i.e. the material conditions of the coming to consciousness of right. Spinoza
at once raises the possibility of these arguments to the material plane, such
that one could speak of an imperium
of human rights, but in so doing is perfectly aware that on this ‘level-playing
field’ of right, such an imperium is at the mercy of greater power, even if
irrational. There is no claim in Spinozism that a concept must attain
its self-realisation, except in the case of the first.
7. Inconsistency of multiple imperia each expressing one particular
right
In TPIII Spinoza now
proceeds with what one might call a reductio ad bellum argument. In the Ethics
he sought to show that multiple attributes must either have nothing in
common or lack the very infinity that defined them, and that it must be the
case that substance expresses an infinity of mutually exclusive attributes, or
absurdity results. This takes place firstly by a restriction on free thought
and action to prevent disorder, which we discuss in this section, then by a counterargument
that prevention of disorder is less feasible depending on the order the imperium pretends to impose.
Now, at the finite
level of imperia, Spinoza reprises his working definition of the virtue of the imperium as security in order to
establish the problematic relation that must subsist between the multiple
imperia expressing with varying virtue their respective combined right. It must
be remarked that while Spinoza seems now, in TPII[17], to have formally
redefined the imperium as the potentia
multitudinis, this continues in no way to contradict his general thesis
that an imperium can spring up
anywhere that two or more humans combine to perform work. This is evident from
the following discussion, where though a more ‘state-like’ imperium is now in play in the argument, with its corporate powers
and common consent, Spinoza continues the state of nature into this imperium by allowing for dissent and
riot as imperia within the same ‘sphere’. Each such imperium expresses a certain degree of virtue according to the
combination of the power of constituent rights, and as such expresses its
constituent common nature as ‘humanity’. In TPIII[11] Spinoza somewhat elides
the looseness of union that characterises the city when he determines that as
between imperia “the two imperia are in the same relation to one another as
are two people in the state of Nature” subject to the exception that an imperium can take better precautions
against subjugation. Our interpretation of common right indicates why Spinoza
treats the states of war and alliance (foedus) as oscillating in the way
they do. It is only insofar as the commonwealths pursue a common purpose – fear
of loss or hope of gain – that they project a commonality of right around which
the citizens mutually circulate. As this purpose vanishes, so the commonality
of projection vanishes in the minds of each, and the imperia pursue the next
most advantageous purpose that constitutes themselves as imperium, and so, to the extent that these purposes divide the
imperia, they are again in a state of war.
The Spinozan model
thus has a tendency to collapse back into an explicit state of nature, and for
groups of citizens across boundaries to form imperia as they see fit, but this
somewhat overlooks the stress Spinoza is placing on the ‘nature’ of officiating
imperia specifically. By officiating we mean the civil order which is entrusted
to offices [10]. It is not the case that Spinoza is saying that notional
transfers of natural right to officers occur, and that this constitutes an imperium, but rather that the “most
charitable” role of the officer “is to safeguard peace and promote
harmony” (TPIII[10]) which is most effectively achieved by fostering reason
and easing the path to actualisation of the multitude’s common purpose
(TPIII[7]).
This argument is
conducted in the space that exists between the right of multitude considered
collectively and the right of each individual. The basic principle,
self-evident for Spinoza, is that as this multitudinous right exceeds the
individual’s right, so the latter is restrained from acting in a manner not
permitted by the imperium [11]. It is
here, however, that our causal analysis of eternity and its role in essential
consciousness plays an important role and helps us re-balance the fatalism
which dogs interpretations of the Tractatus politicus. If we remember
that to think in eternity is to appear to re-order the causal chain so that
one, as it were, immediately completes to infinity one’s act, then we can
understand the faith Spinoza places in reason over against an irrational imperium. Thus the very first cause of
being is eternal and remains after death, but also each act of intuition is
eternal and incapable of being undone by finite power. Even ideas of the second
kind of cognition have a certain species of eternity which render them
exemplary in the imperium. It is with
this rather Stoic armoury that Spinoza proceeds to bear the worst of the imperium and to establish just how far
its expressed communal power extends.
Having established
that the imperium cannot leave all
matters of judgement up to private individuals, lest it dissolve almost
immediately according to whim, Spinoza argues that in matters of common decree
even the rational human must consider herself bound though she disagree with
the rationality of that law. One wonders whether in this Spinoza has not been
inspired by Grotius, whose De veritate religionis christianae discusses
the issue of higher and middle goods, or Stoic goods and indifferents [12]. Grotius’
Meletius offers an even more explicit consideration of indifferents, for
it is here that we find a conception integral to Spinoza’s own view, namely
that there could be only the ultimate good: Deo frui, sive beatitudo [13]. Against beatitude, both
Grotius and Spinoza argue, all other deemed goods are in fact indifferent. Where
they differ, it is in Grotius’ voluntarism in determining that what may be
metaphysically indifferent under natural law falls under custom so that
according to mores things may be declared good or bad, and that these are done
so, Grotius adds, because they may help in the attainment of the ultimate good.
Grotius’ list of such middle goods is wide, ranging from life and learning to
wealth and honour, with middle bads ranging over shame and poverty [14]. Spinoza
places the stress of means to the ultimate good not on objects but on common life,
on combined consciousness. It is association which is the most useful thing,
not wealth. Every other good, save perhaps learning as reason, is relegated to
the status of derivative of the middle good of association, itself indifferent
with respect to beatitude. With this demotion is taken the character of
contingency and tradition, whereas common association is always good and is always
to be sought in the state of nature. Though Spinoza may not have intended it,
there is room to argue that from the Grotian perspective the principle of
association has become a natural law. Our major point, however, is that we can
see how Spinoza may regard rational laws in relation to middle goods and bads
as attracting the Stoic ethical response they deserve – indifference from the
perspective of the summum bonum.
Spinoza now turns and
begins to dismantle the juridical structure of absolute determination of law,
declaring that he has explained how far the power, and consequently the right,
of the imperium extends.
8. The unification of imperia under one right: towards the imperium
intuitivum
In TPIII[7 – 9]
Spinoza links together his arguments with three points, which we reconstruct as
follows.
(a) The human that
thinks in eternity is in respect of those acts expressing the power of God or
Nature. Such acts are incontrovertible and completed in and for eternity. Likewise
the rational human acts according to a certain species of eternity in having
adequate ideas. Such a human, in respect of these acts is most powerful and has
the most right and virtue, and bears the finite restraints of the state of
nature and the passionate imperium
with equanimity, for duration fades in their thought. An imperium which harnessed such a human’s power would thus express
this virtue and would derive its own endurance from that right. That is, as
with the human, the imperium
expressing rational power would likewise be in greater possession of its right
in the state of nature [15]. Remember that by endurance Spinoza ultimately
means lack of restraint from expressing one’s nature; it is not remaining the
same through time but the condition of experiencing no time whatsoever. An imperium seeking security, that is,
endurance, should endeavour to harness this virtue by creating the conditions
in which all its bodies were able to attain such virtue [16].
(b) The imperium’s right is necessarily finite
with respect to particular things:
1. No one can be
induced to give up their judgement, and that as such the rational human cannot
be forced to deny reason at the imperium’s
behest. Spinoza may or may not see the contradiction with his claim that the
rational should obey irrational laws, though, if he holds the Stoic/Grotian
view of indifferents, this argument must distinguish between irrational laws
about middle goods and bads, and irrational laws that threaten the aim
of the imperium (that is, threaten
the possibility of communal life as the means to the highest good).
2. No one without hope
or fear can be subjected to laws, for they either have no regard for threats
and punishments, or they see no reason to love the political order (statum).
The interesting thing
about both these points, though they appear to be aimed at the mad, criminal,
and free thinkers, is that Spinoza is perfectly aware that his own Ethics
characterises the wise human as someone exercising reason in both guises and
being un-swayed, thanks to the power of the idea Dei, by hopes and
fears. The more explicit argument, which flows from (a), is that the imperium must understand that its power
will only extend into the judgements of the wise if those very judgements are
acts of love for the imperium. Again
the imperium must engage with reason
or be doomed to have its right limited and its duration defined [17]. Liberal
interpreters may seize on a possible distinction between laws pertaining to
middle goods and those pertaining to the highest aim of the imperium to argue that Spinoza thereby
leaves a liberal space for free exchange which must be respected by all rational
citizens. This misconstrues both the aims, range and criticality of communal
life in Spinoza’s thought. So intrinsic is this conception to human endeavour,
and so primary is it to the attainment of sufficient virtue, that communal life
can in no way be limited to a public sphere. Every act must be subjected to the
consideration of whether it furthers communal life. Thus every act must first
be determined worthy of indifference, rather than being assumed or pre-determined
as such.
(c) As if to hammer
home the above two arguments, Spinoza asserts that the primary security risk
for the imperium is its own constituents.
Any decree which arouses general indignation will be subject to a conspiracy
against it equal to the combined right of the conspirators. In other words, the
imperium by its irrationality will
have generated another imperium whose right may exceed its own and by which it
will be replaced. To avoid this, the imperium must ensure that it tacks the
closer to reason [18].
In the depths of this
argument is an idea which should not surprise us: that the commonality of
humans derives from their virtue and is expressed by their reason; the more
virtuous, the more humans have in common and the more they seek mutual company;
this mutual company forms an imperium
which, so constituted by higher virtue, is more powerful and expresses their
common nature in a greater way; but reason is united in the Infinite
Understanding; so if two imperia exist which are virtuous in this order, they
will each act in the same manner and seek each other’s company; they thus will
form an imperium of combined natural
rights, and so on until all humanity is thus combined in the state of fostering
reason, though whether we can speak of humanity anymore is questionable for the
reasons already discussed in the article on Power (Potentia). Spinoza thus recovers his argument for God or Nature’s
uniqueness also on the politico-juridical plane of natural right.
In view of the
foregoing, we define:
The imperium intuitivum
is an imperium constituted by
particular things each of whose right approaches the limit of beatitude.
As we have already
mentioned much earlier, Spinoza’s work is grounded in having established that
existing thinking things necessarily have as their first idea this passage to
the true infinite, albeit that they may not conceive the idea of this idea (we
might say they have not risen to consciousness of their own most power). This
means that each thinking thing is always already a citizen by right of the imperium intuitivum as Spinoza conceives
it and as such Spinoza echoes the Pauline distinction drawn up from Roman law
between the ius gentium now deriving conflictually from every temporal imperium, and one ius naturale
(literally with Spinoza the right of the state of nature) which is at once
immanent to and overarches every civilian law. For Spinoza’s treatment of
Paul’s doctrine, cf. for example Chapter 4 of the Tractatus
Theologico-politicus.
This formal idea of an
imperium intuitivum grounds the practical argument that the most
enduring imperium, the one that is
the most secure, is in fact the one that most fosters rationality and thus
approaches its own overcoming in the imperium intuitivum. This is the social
transition in Spinozism. Just as the machine was raised to its infinite limit
as the divine machine, now the city as social machine is raised to its limit as
the infinite right-producing machine. This is, as considered between its
constituents, at once cosmopolis and eternal and infinite intellect of
God. As Spinoza writes in EVP40 Scholium:
…our mind, in so far as it understands, is an eternal mode of
thinking, which is determined by another eternal mode of thinking, and that
again by another, and so on to infinity, in such a way that they all constitute
simultaneously the eternal and infinite intellect of God.
The citizens of the imperium intuitivum are sources of an
infinite power which is determined by their relations inter se (cf. The
Cartesian cosmological hypothesis illustrated above) in a manner which appears
to confirm the ‘higher’ equilibrium of power at the level of the infinite
machine, but, remember, which power is issuing forth transitions in the finite
world of duration insofar as the formal essences of the imperium intuitivum are being expressed by appropriate relations in
the finite level. To be clear, the finite imperia together constitute a general
equilibrium of human relations expressing the aggregate of finite powers, but
immanent to this there is a formal social plane occupied by one imperium intuitivum which is constituted
by each person to the extent that they express the infinite potentia Dei.
Hier ist die Rose, hier tanze. It is this difference between the
infinite orders of imperia which makes ethics possible, insofar as natural
right now derives also from infinite power and constitutes the means for
fostering the citizen.
With the revelation of
the immanence of the imperium intuitivum
it would seem that Spinoza’s journey from divine power to the divine law has
attained its end in the rarefied aether
of the cosmos. Yet the doctrine of power is but one critical moment of
Spinoza’s metaphysical structure which it would be easy to raise out of its
context. While the multitude, for example, may seem as a derivative of power
(constituted by it), it would be wrong to accept any form of subordination of
multitude to power. The multitude as by its own nature something of equal
generative moment within the system. Indeed, at the end of the Ethics, when beatitude is attained,
close attention to the text indicated that a return to the world of the
multitude is not only necessary, but constitutes a further, higher, step into
ethical self-awareness, which could be summarised by the dictum “love thy
swarming affects”. Einstein praised Spinoza for his unwavering faith in the
good order of God’s laws, but in fact this is as nothing to Spinoza’s joyous
faith in the ordered disorder of the multitude. Any full appreciation of the imperium must therefore account for the
role of the multitude (and for that matter the civil law) within its
legal-political structure.
Notes
1. (1976:433) and for
Bellers see n.5 ibid.
2. TPI(6).
3. (1997:1).
4. Curley in Garrett
(1996:315 – 342).
5. (1958:265 n.5).
6. TPII(13).
7. TPII(14).
8. TPII(15).
9. The well-known “una
veluti mente ducuntur”.
10. Cf. Agamben’s
acheology of the office in Opus Dei (2012).
11. TPIII(2), but
already stated in TPII(16).
12. (1755 {1627}) I,
vii “Tum vero instituta quadam ita & homnibus communia, ut non tam
naturae instinctui, aut evidenti rationis collectioni, quam perpetuae &
vix paucis in locis per malitiam aut calamitatem interruptae traditioni,
accepta ferri dabeant: qualis olim fuit victimarum in sacris mactatio, &
nunc quoque pudor circa res Veneris, nuptiarum solemnia, &
incestorum fuga”. Compare Kant’s definition of marriage.
13. Meletius (13), quoted by
Besselink in Blom & Winkel (2004:193).
14. Meletius (58), quoted in
Besselink id.
15. I.e. as against other imperia. TPIII concludes with a discussion
of international politics and law.
16. TPIII(7).
17. TPIII(8).
18. TPIII(9).
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